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Abstract
We provide aggregate macroeconomic evidence on how, in the long-run, a diverse
degree of complexity in production may affect not only the rate of economic growth,
but also the correlation between the latter, population growth and the monopolistic
(intermediate) markups. For a sample of OECD countries, we find that the impact
of population change on economic growth is slightly positive. According to our the-
oretical model, this implies that the losses due to more complexity in production are
lower than the corresponding specialization gains. Using a Finite Mixture Model, we
also classify the countries in the sample and verify for each cluster the impact that
the population growth rate and the intermediate sector’s markups exert on the 5-year
average real GDP growth rate.
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“The productivity-enhancing effects of horizontal innovations are not. . . obvious. . . For while
having more products definitely opens up more possibilities for specialization, and of having
instruments more closely matched with a variety of needs, it also makes life more
complicated and creates greater chance of error. . . .”
(Aghion and Howitt [3], p. 407.)
1 Introduction
Economic theory has long ago made clear that the degree of product market compe-
tition (PMC, henceforth) and the rate of population growth have a strong impact on
economic growth. This occurs because they affect, respectively, the path of future
profits accruing to the successful innovator and the availability of researchers in an
economy.
In order to analyze, both theoretically and empirically, how population growth
and the extent of the monopolistic markups rewarding prospective innovators may
simultaneously affect economic growth, we employ a simple extension of the canonical
semi-endogenous growth model by Jones [30]. The main reason for using this frame-
work resides in the fact that in two companion contributions Jones [29]-[30] provided
convincing evidence against two broad categories of fully endogenous growth models
(the AK-type and the R&D-based, respectively). In particular, the evidence against
the first generation of R&D-based fully endogenous growth models (i.e., Romer [52];
Grossman and Helpman [23]; Aghion and Howitt [2]) is especially persuasive. These
models predict that economic growth is proportional to the amount of resources in-
vested in R&D (the number of researchers allocated to this activity). Nonetheless,
in the last few decades R&D investments have increased remarkably in most of ad-
vanced countries, with the long-run growth rates of per capita output and total factor
productivity of these countries not showing a comparable upward trend.
The aim of the present paper is twofold. The first goal is to re-examine the
long-run relationships between PMC and economic growth, and between population
growth and economic growth. Re-assessing these much debated connections is still
important especially because we are now aware that the introduction of new vari-
eties of horizontally-differentiated intermediate inputs (i.e., an improvement in the
rate of technological change) determines a trade-off between productivity gains (due
to more specialization) and productivity losses (due to more complexity). Our mod-
elling strategy differs from the traditional semi-endogenous growth theory (Jones [30])
because it accounts explicitly for this trade-off.1
The second goal is to reach a quantitative understanding of the complexity effect
associated to technological progress (intermediate inputs proliferation), in comparison
to the more standard specialization effect of variety-expansion.
To have an immediate picture of the mechanisms described in our paper, consider
an R&D-based growth model a` la Romer [52] and suppose, as in Jones [30], that there
1In the canonical semi-endogenous growth model, the complexity effect is either non-existent or very
small, and as such totally negligible. Furthermore, in Jones [30] the equilibrium markup of any intermediate-
input’s price over its marginal cost of production is not disentangled from the factor-inputs shares in GDP.
By explicitly disentangling the two measures, our analysis also allows an in-depth examination of the long-
run nexus between the rate of economic growth and the intermediate local monopolists’ market power.
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are diminishing technological opportunities in the sector that produces new ideas for
new varieties of differentiated intermediates. Diminishing technological opportunities
means that a researcher becomes less and less productive as the number of exist-
ing ideas grows up, so that in the long-run it is possible to keep on innovating at
a constant pace only if the aggregate stock of researchers increases. In turn, if this
stock is proportional to population size, the number of available researchers could
ultimately be expanded only through an increase of population. A larger population
generates therefore three different effects in our setting: one is direct, while the other
two are indirect. The first effect is unambiguously positive and operates directly on
the aggregate production function: with a rising population, more people can be em-
ployed to produce final output, and this clearly increases aggregate GDP. The two
remaining effects are instead indirect, operate on the aggregate production function
through the availability of new ideas, and are opposing in sign. With a larger pop-
ulation, more people can in principle be employed also in the R&D sector, which in
turn leads to an increase in the number of existing ideas (i.e., intermediate goods
varieties in our economy). If this number goes up, then two contrasting outcomes
can simultaneously be observed on the aggregate GDP. On the one hand, due to the
higher number of ideas, the productivity of all the other inputs (namely, labor and
intermediates) can increase, so facilitating an increase of total GDP, as well (this is
the positive and indirect specialization effect). On the other hand, however, having
more varieties of intermediate inputs to be assembled in the same aggregate produc-
tion function can also cause a rise of the degree of complexity of the technology in
use, which ultimately determines a loss of the economy’s GDP. Unlike the standard
semi-endogenous growth theory, our model suggests that in the long run a fully pos-
itive effect of population growth on per capita income growth is possible only if the
productivity losses, arising from more complexity, are sufficiently small and, in any
case, lower than the related productivity gains resulting from more specialization. In
contrast, when the (productivity) losses arising from complexity are greater than the
corresponding (productivity) gains coming from specialization, the effect of popula-
tion growth on the growth rate of per capita GDP is definitely negative. In this case,
our model also suggests that it is possible to increase the economy’s growth rate by
reducing the incentives to produce new ideas (i.e., by lowering, ceteris paribus, the de-
gree of monopoly power rewarded to the potential innovator). Finally, the population
growth has a negative impact while the monopolistic markup has a positive influence
on the long-run economic growth rate (at most, both impacts are equal to zero) in
the intermediate case in which the productivity losses due to production complexity
are moderately large, but still lower than (or at most equal to) the productivity gains
resulting from specialization.2
2In this paper, we do not aim at capturing the mutual evolution of population growth, technological in-
centives, and per capita GDP along an economic and demographic transition toward a long-run equilibrium
characterized by low fertility and mortality rates, high levels of R&D investments and persistent growth
in per capita income (as in Galor [21] and Jones and Vollrath [34].) Hence, we choose a variant of the
basic semi-endogenous growth model in which population growth and the intermediate sector monopolistic
markup are both exogenous variables, and focus on the long-run nexus between population change and
economic growth and between markups and economic growth. It is also out of the scope of this paper
to illustrate any new mechanism able to command an economy’s take-off from a “stagnant-equilibrium
3
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The main advantage of our model, therefore, is that it is able to account simulta-
neously for a non-monotonous, non-uniform relationship not only between population
growth and economic growth but also, and concurrently, between the degree of the
monopolistic markup and economic growth. This is the most important difference
between our theoretical results and those of the basic semi-endogenous growth model
(Jones [30]), which does not allow any analysis of the long-run connection between
PMC and economic growth while predicting, at the same time, an always-positive
impact of the exogenous population growth rate on economic growth.
In the econometric part of the paper, we explicitly deal with this non-mono-
tonicity. Using a semi-parametric approach, we find that the population growth
rate produces a (slightly) positive influence on real per capita GDP growth, for a
sample of OECD countries. Furthermore, when statistically significant, the impact
of the monopolistic markup on growth is found to be barely negative or positive.
Despite the magnitudes of these effects being sensitive to the estimation procedure,
the quantitative analysis shows that (on average) countries in our sample behave
consistently with the theoretical case in which the specialization effect prevails on the
complexity effect.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature on
the topic and explains the differences with our contribution. Section 3 provides the
theoretical model and illustrates the differential impact that population growth and
markups may have on long-run economic growth depending on the relative degree of
complexity in production. In section 4, we present our econometric strategy, describe
the employed dataset, discuss the econometric results, and provide some robustness
checks. Section 5 summarizes, concludes and proposes new possible directions for
future research.
2 Related literature
Recent theoretical research (both industrial organization- and macro- based) finds
mixed results in the correlation between PMC and economic growth. The exist-
ing empirical evidence confirms the non-monotonicity of this relation.3 Similarly, a
complete agreement on the sign of the long-run correlation between population and
economic growth rates has not emerged yet, both theoretically and empirically.4
steady state”into a self-sustaining “growth-equilibrium steady state”, during which the GDP’s share spent
on R&D activities and population aging ultimately increase, while fertility and mortality fall. Instead, we
develop a simple model in which, however, R&D activity plays a significant and explicit role.
3While Nickell [48] and Blundell et al. [10]-[11] find that competitive pressures encourage innovation
and, therefore, have a positive effect on productivity growth in a long-run perspective, Aghion and Griffith’s
[1] review of the empirical literature on the topic points out that the relationship between competition and
growth is, in general, non-monotonous and, in particular, inverted U-shaped.
4According to Sala-i-Martin et al. [53], the sign of the whole impact of population growth on economic
growth is ambiguous. Using a sample of 78 countries between 1965 and 1990, Williamson ([57], pp. 113-115)
shows that there is no significant relationship between population and economic growth rates. This result,
however, is sensitive to the empirical specification employed. For example, when the log of life-expectancy
in 1960 and two further controls for economic geography are added, population growth is shown to generate
a positive and significant impact on GDP per capita growth. Bruce and Turnovsky [12] also assess the link
4
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The state of the debate on the relation between demographic change and economic
growth is very well summarized by the main argument of Kelley and Schmidt [36]. Us-
ing both cross-section and time-series data, the authors provide compelling evidence
that the impact of population growth on per capita income growth has changed over
time (it has been statistically not significant in the 1960s and the 1970s and sta-
tistically significant, large and negative in the 1980s), and varies with the level of
economic development (it is generally negative in less developed countries and can be
positive for some developed countries). The authors explain these results through the
fact that the impact of population change on economic development may be drasti-
cally different in sign depending on which specific component of population growth is
especially affected by a given demographic shock. An increase of population growth,
attained through a rise of fertility, has a monotonically negative consequence on eco-
nomic growth, whereas the same increase of population growth, achieved through a
decline of mortality, has a monotonically positive influence on the growth rate of real
per capita income. This has profound implications for the analysis, as it suggests
that the composition of a simultaneous rise of fertility and decline of mortality, both
leading to a higher population growth rate, is in theory an important explanation of
the emergence of a non-monotonous relationship between population and economic
growth rates. Following a similar line of reasoning, in a recent paper Prettner [49]
proves that introducing a more realistic demographic structure within the canonical
fully- and semi-endogenous growth models is desirable, as it allows to disentangle
the growth effects of a changing population from those of a changing individuals’
age-structure. He finds that decreasing mortality has a positive effect on long-run
economic growth, while the converse holds true for decreasing fertility. The positive
growth effects of decreases in mortality outweigh the negative growth effects of de-
creases in fertility in fully-endogenous growth models a` la Romer [52], while these
positive and negative growth effects exactly offset each other in semi-endogenous
growth models a` la Jones [30]. In our paper, we do not split the population growth
rate into its birth- and death- rate components, and continue to postulate that the
economy is populated by representative (identical) individuals/households living for-
ever. This is done because we are indeed interested in uncovering (both theoretically
and empirically) the long-run correlation between the overall rate of demographic
change and the rate of real per capita GDP growth. This also explains why in our
analysis the rate of population growth is an exogenous variable.
It is worth noting that our model can also account for the possibility of a negative
long-run correlation between population and economic growth rates in R&D-based
models. Despite we are not the first to obtain a similar result (in particular, see
Prettner [50]), the way we attain it is new.5 Specifically, in our model there is
between population growth and economic growth in a model with a two-parameter survivorship function.
Their calibrations show that an increase in the population growth rate, caused either by higher fertility or
reduced mortality, lowers the income growth rate.
5Using a Romer [52]-Jones [30]’s setup, Prettner [50] has already shown, indeed, that an increase in
population growth, while positively influencing aggregate human capital accumulation, decreases simul-
taneously schooling intensity (defined as the productivity of teachers times the public resources spent on
educating each child). The fall of schooling intensity has, in turn, a negative impact on the future evolution
of aggregate human capital. If the negative effect dominates, the resulting slowdown of aggregate human
5
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no human capital investment; the reason for this choice is twofold. First, from the
empirical standpoint, including human capital in our regressions does not significantly
alter our results.6 Second, and more important, from the theoretical standpoint, we
opt for a parsimonious framework which is, however, able to capture the interplay
between productivity-increasing (due to specialization) and productivity-decreasing
(due to complexity) generated by a variety expansion. To our knowledge, the analysis
of the economic implications of this channel is novel within the rich literature studying
the relation between population change and economic growth, and represents the main
contribution of this article.
In our model, the balance between the specialization effect and the complexity
effect crucially impacts on the sign of the long-run correlations between population
and economic growth, and between markups and economic growth. This is in line with
the Kremer [38]’s “O-Ring theory”, according to which for some countries (especially
those using particularly “complicated”production processes) the productivity-gains
from more specialization might be overcome by the associated productivity-losses
due to a more complex production organization. Our paper shows that when this
happens we should observe not only a different level of the growth rate of per capita
income but also, and perhaps more importantly, a change in the relation between
economic growth, population growth and markups across countries.7
Our work is especially related to Bucci [13] [14], Bucci and Raurich [15], Ferrarini
and Scaramozzino [20], and Maggioni et al. [42]. Unlike Bucci [13], it is not an
objective of this article to emphasize the growth effects of the so-called returns to
specialization (Benassy [9]) and their role in shaping the link between population
growth-economic growth and between markups-economic growth. Moreover, contrary
to Bucci [13], we pay no attention here to how the type of agents’ intertemporal
utility might additionally affect the relationship between population and economic
growth rates. Differently from Bucci [14], instead, we analyze here the simplest
possible semi-endogenous growth model without human capital accumulation. In
this respect, the present paper formally demonstrates that having (either exogenous
or endogenous accumulation of aggregate) human capital within a semi-endogenous
growth framework is not essential in yielding the result of a non-uniform relation
between population and economic growth rates. Unlike Bucci and Raurich [15], we
do not aim at explaining the differential impact that in the long-run a given change
in the population growth rate may have on economic growth through either: (i) the
nature (fully- or semi-endogenous) of the process of economic growth, or (ii) the
peculiar engine(s) driving economic growth (i.e., human capital, R&D, or both).
Following the methodology developed by Lafay [39], Hausmann and Klinger [25],
Hidalgo et al. [28], Hausmann and Hidalgo [24], Ferrarini and Scaramozzino [20]
use data on net trade flows to compute a measure for complexity in production,
namely the production density index, for 89 countries along the period 1990-2009.
For these countries, they separately estimate, through a panel data GLS model, the
impact of a larger product density on the level and the growth rate of GDP per
capital accumulation eventually reduces technological progress and, therefore, economic growth.
6See sub-section 4.4.
7In a recent paper, Neves Sequeira et al. [47] apply the entropy to capture the complexity effect into an
endogenous growth framework.
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capita. For the whole sample, density has a positive and significant coefficient on the
level of GDP per capita (countries occupying the denser areas of the product space
have on average higher GDP per capita, with causality going from the former to the
latter). However, when the sample is split by income levels, it is observed that density
positively affects GDP per capita in middle/low income countries, while it dampens
per capita income for the group of high-income countries. Concerning the growth
regressions (that examine the relationship between product density and economic
growth by including the initial level of GDP per capita as a regressor), the authors
find that, for the whole sample of countries, the coefficient on density is still positive
and significant. This result is confirmed when the sample is split by aggregated income
groups (high vs. middle/low income countries). However, by considering six different
geographical regions separately, it is observed that only for Europe and North America
the parameter on the density variable is significantly negative. In line with the “O-
Ring theory”, the evidence presented by Ferrarini and Scaramozzino [20] supports the
idea that, especially for advanced countries, it can be the case that the productivity-
gains from more specialization are smaller than the associated productivity-losses due
to increased complexity in production. Unlike Ferrarini and Scaramozzino [20], we
focus solely on advanced (OECD) countries, employ a different econometric technique,
and analyze how the balance between complexity and specialization (induced by input
proliferation) contributes to affect not only the rate of economic growth, but also the
joint long-run relation between population growth, economic growth, and markups.
Finally, by using a sample of Turkish manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2008,
Maggioni et al. [42] study the link between complexity and volatility at the firm-level.
Their main conclusion is that firms producing more complex goods (i.e., goods re-
quiring a wider set of diverse and exclusive capabilities) enjoy higher output stability.
Differently from Maggioni et al. [42], we employ here a macro-level perspective and
focus on the role of product/country complexity on aggregate economic growth, rather
than firms’ output volatility. In this sense, our analysis offers a nice complement to
Maggioni et al. [42]’s contribution.
3 The Model
3.1 Production and R&D technology
In this section, we present a version of Romer [52], with four relevant departures,
concerning respectively: i) the shape of the aggregate production function; ii) the
technology for producing intermediate inputs; iii) the production function of “ideas”;
iv) the presence of a positive population growth rate. In what follows, we comment
in more detail on these four differences.
We consider the following aggregate production function:
Yt = L
1−α
Y t
[
1
Nβt
∫ Nt
0
(xit)
1/mdi
]αm
with 0 < α < 1 and m > 1 (1)
This production function formalizes the idea (Aghion and Howitt, [3], Chap. 12,
equation 12.4, p. 407) that:
7
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“. . .The productivity-enhancing effects of horizontal innovations are not
[. . . ] obvious. . . For while having more products definitely opens up more
possibilities for specialization, and of having instruments more closely matched
with a variety of needs, it also makes life more complicated and creates
greater chance of error . . . ”
In equation (1), LY is the labor input employed in the production of the homo-
geneous final good (Y ), xi, with i = 0 . . . N , is the quantity of the i-th variety of
differentiated capital goods/intermediate inputs, and m is a technological parameter.
The elasticity of substitution between any generic pair of varieties of differentiated
capital goods is given by m/(m−1). A decrease in m, by increasing the substitutabil-
ity between durables, leads to tougher competition across capital-goods producers and
to lower prices. Thus, m can be used as a (inverse) measure of the degree of competi-
tion in the intermediate product market. In a moment, we show thatm is, indeed, the
optimal markup on the production marginal cost in the durables sector (see equation
(5)). As a whole, the aggregate production function (1) displays constant returns to
scale to private and rival inputs (LY and xi) and, following Ethier [18] and Benassy
[7], [8] and [9], allows disentangling the measure of product market concentration (m)
from the factor-shares in GDP (α and 1-α).8
Depending on its magnitude, parameter β summarizes the different effects that
innovation may have on GDP. In particular, when positive, β is meant to capture the
detrimental effect on Y of having a larger number of intermediate-input varieties to
be assembled in the same manufacturing process. This is the complexity effect. This
effect contrasts with the traditional and positive specialization effect that is reflected
by the upper bound of the integral within the square bracket of equation (1). Under
symmetry - when xi = x > 0 ∀i ∈ [0, N ] - and with LY > 0 and N ∈ [0,∞), equation
(1) suggests that an increase in N may have either a positive (if β < 1, i.e. the
specialization effect is larger than the complexity effect), or a negative (if β > 1, i.e.
the specialization effect is lower than the complexity effect), or else no impact at all
on aggregate output (if β = 1, i.e. the specialization effect is offset by the complexity
effect).9
Using equation (1), it is possible to compute the inverse demand function for the
i-th intermediate:
pit = αL
1−α
Y t
[
1
Nβt
∫ Nt
0
(xit)
1/mdi
]αm−1
1
Nβt
x
1−m
m
it (2)
8Since final output is produced competitively under constant returns to scale to rival inputs, at equi-
librium LY and xi are rewarded according to their marginal productivities. Hence, for given N , (1 − α)
is the share of Y going to labor and α is the share of total GDP going to intermediate inputs. A more
exhaustive and formal discussion of the relations between Ethier [18] and Benassy [7], [8] and [9] and the
specification used in equation (1) above can be found in Bucci ([13], pp. 2027-2028).
9In equation (1) we observe that if β < 0, then there is no complexity effect, since this parameter
would amplify the positive effect of specialization emerging from the upper bound of the integral inside the
square bracket. A fortiori, this is also true when β = 0 (again, in this case we would end up with the sole,
traditional specialization-effect in the square bracket). Therefore, in order to model explicitly a complexity
effect arising from an increase of N , some positive β is needed. However, in what follows we do not make
any ad hoc assumption on the magnitude of the upper bound of β.
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The second difference with respect to Romer [52] is related to the technology for
producing intermediates. In this regard, we postulate that monopolistically compet-
itive firms have access to the same one-to-one technology employing solely labor as
an input (as in Grossman and Helpman [23] Chap. 3):10
xit = lit ∀i ∈ [0, Nt] Nt ∈ [0,∞) (3)
where li is the amount of labor required in the production of the i-th durable, whose
output is xi. Thus, the marginal cost of production is the wage. For given Nt,
equation (3) implies that the total amount of labor employed in the intermediate
sector at time t, LIt, is given by:∫ Nt
0
xitdi =
∫ Nt
0
litdi = LIt (4)
Under the assumption that there exists no strategic interaction across interme-
diate firms, maximization of the generic i-th firm’s instantaneous profit leads to the
traditional markup rule:11
pit = mwIt = mwt = pt ∀i ∈ [0;Nt] (5)
This expression says that the price is the same for all intermediate goods i and
equal to a constant markup (m) on the marginal production cost (wt) - in a moment
we explain why we use wIt = wt.
Because of symmetry across producers of intermediate inputs (see equation (5)),
equation (4) implies:
xit = xt =
LIt
Nt
∀i ∈ [0;Nt] (4’)
and therefore:
πit = α
(
m− 1
m
)(
LY t
Nt
)1−α(LIt
Nt
)α
N
α[m(1−β)−1]
t = πt ∀i ∈ [0;Nt] (6)
The third difference with respect to Romer [52] is related to the aggregate R&D
technology:
N˙t =
1
χ
LλNtN
φ
t with N(0) > 0, χ > 0, 0 < λ ≤ 1, φ < 1 (7)
where χ is a technological parameter, Nt is the number of ideas already invented and
LNt is the labor input employed in research. In this model, labor (L) is employed to
10 In the on-line Appendix C (not intended for publication), we formally show that our results would
not qualitatively change if physical capital (instead of labor), accumulated through households’ savings, is
assumed to be the only input in the one-to-one technology for producing intermediates.
11More precisely, we assume that each of these firms is so small that it takes
[
1
Nβt
∫ Nt
0
(xit)
1/mdi
]αm−1
as given, hence:
∂
∂xit
[
1
Nβt
∫ Nt
0
(xit)
1/mdi
]αm−1
= 0
9
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produce, respectively, consumption goods (LY ), durables (LI), and ideas (LN ). Since
it is assumed to be perfectly mobile, at equilibrium labor will be rewarded according
to a unique wage rate, i.e. wY t ≡ wIt ≡ wNt ≡ wt.
The fourth and last difference we introduce in this model with respect to Romer
[52] is that population grows at a positive, constant and exogenous rate, L˙tLt ≡ n > 0.
12
Equation (7) stems from the criticism of strong scale effect one may find in the first-
generation of Schumpeterian growth models (see Jones [30], equation (6), p. 765;
Jones [33], equation (16), p. 1074). In equation (7), λ and φ denote, respectively,
the returns to the labor input employed in research and the intertemporal spillover
coming from the accumulated stock of (disembodied) knowledge. When φ < 1, higher
values of N imply that the same amount of R&D resources (research labor) generates
a lower growth rate of ideas, i.e. there exist diminishing technological opportunities.
The presence of diminishing technological opportunities is key to the removal of the
strong scale effect in the first-generation of R&D-based growth models: since the
marginal impact of an individual researcher on the growth rate of new ideas decreases
with the stock of existing ideas, it is possible to maintain a constant rate of innovation
only by increasing (at a constant rate, too) the number of researchers. This, in turn,
is possible solely if the economy’s population grows at a positive rate. Since the R&D
sector is competitive, i.e. Nt is endogenously determined by the free entry condition,
the wage rate of one unit of research labor-input is given by:
wNt =
1
χ
Nφt
L1−λNt
VNt (8)
where
VNt =
∫ ∞
t
πτe
−
∫ τ
t
r(s)dsdτ ∀τ > t (9)
In equations (8) and (9), VN is the market value of the generic i-th blueprint, π is
the instantaneous profit of the i-th intermediate firm, and r denotes the real rate of
return on households’ asset holdings (to be introduced in a moment).
3.2 Households
The number of infinitely lived households of this economy is constant and normalized
to one. Hence, the size of population/labor-force coincides with the size of the single
dynastic family (L), which supplies labor inelastically. The representative household
uses savings (forgone consumption) to accumulate assets, taking the form of ownership
claims on firms. Thus,
A˙t = (rtAt + wtLt)− Ct with A(0) > 0 (10)
In equation (10), A, C and L denote, respectively, household’s asset holdings,
consumption and labor-input, w is the real wage and r is the real rate of return on
A.13 According to this equation, household’s investment in assets (the LHS) equals
12We simplify further the analysis by assuming that the aggregate labor-force equals the total population.
Under this assumption per capita and per-worker variables do coincide.
13Notice that, in this economy, all labor is employed and at equilibrium obtains the same wage, w.
10
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159247 
household’s savings (the RHS). In turn, household’s savings are equal to the difference
between household’s income (the sum of interest income, rA, and labor income, wL)
and household’s consumption (C). Given the above expression, the law of motion of
per capita assets is:
a˙t = (rt − n)at + wt − ct with a(0) > 0 (11)
with a ≡ AL and c ≡
C
L representing per capita asset holdings and per capita consump-
tion, respectively. With a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (CIES)
instantaneous utility function, the objective of the household is to maximize, under
the usual budget constraint, the discounted utility of per capita consumption of all
its members:
max
{ct,at}
t=∞
t=0
U ≡
∫ ∞
0
(
c1−θt − 1
1− θ
)
e−(ρ−n)tdt (12)
s.t. (11)
a(0) given
with θ > 0. In equation (12) we have normalized population at time 0 to one,
L(0) = 1. The representative dynastic family chooses the optimal path of per capita
consumption and asset holdings {ct, at}
t=∞
t=0 , taking the interest rate rt and the wage
rate wt as given. As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin ([6], p. 207, footnote 1), the following
assumption ensures that the attainable inter-temporal utility, U , is bounded and that
the transversality condition holds.
Assumption 1 ρ > n+ (1− θ)γ.
where ρ is the pure subjective discount rate, and γ = γc is the per capita growth rate
of the economy in a balanced growth path equilibrium (to be defined in a moment).
The solution to this problem gives the usual Ramsey-Keynes rule:
γc ≡
c˙t
ct
=
1
θ
(rt − ρ) (13)
3.3 The labor market
Since labor is fully employed and distributed across production of consumption goods,
production of intermediates and invention of new ideas, at equilibrium the following
equalities must hold:
LY t + LNt + LIt = Lt (14)
wY t = wNt = wIt ≡ wt (15)
Equation (14) says that at equilibrium total supply (the RHS) and total demand
(the LHS) of labor must be equal. In the model, labor is a homogeneous factor-input,
i.e. it can be employed interchangeably in the three sectors of the economy. Thus,
11
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labor will continue to move across these sectors until wage equalization is attained
(equation (15)). Moreover, in equilibrium, aggregate household’s asset holdings (A)
must equalize the aggregate value of firms:
At = NtVNt (16)
where VNt is given by equation (9), which can be differentiated to get the canonical
no-arbitrage condition:
V˙Nt = rtVNt − πt (17)
In the model, the i-th idea allows the i-th intermediate firm to produce the i-th
variety of durables. This explains why in equation (16) total assets (A) amount to the
number of profit-making intermediate firms (N) times the market value (VN ) of each
of them (which, in turn, is equal to the market value of each corresponding idea).
On the other hand, the no-arbitrage condition (17) suggests that the return on the
value of the i-th intermediate firm rtVNt must equal to the sum of the instantaneous
monopoly profit accruing to the i-th intermediate input producer (π) and the capital
gain/loss matured on VNt during the small time interval dt (i.e., V˙Nt).
3.4 Equilibrium
In this economy, an allocation and an equilibrium are defined, respectively, as follows:
Definition 1 An allocation is a time path for consumption levels and asset hold-
ings {ct, at}
t=∞
t=0 ; a time path for the available number of intermediate input varieties
{Nt}
∞
t=0; a time path for prices and quantities of each intermediate good {pt, xt}
∞
t=0;
time paths for the real interest rate and wages {rt, wt}
∞
t=0.
Definition 2 An equilibrium is an allocation in which:
1. the evolutions of consumption and asset holdings are consistent with the solu-
tions of the households’ problem (12);
2. the locally monopolistic firms maximize instantaneous profits (6);
3. the evolution of {Nt}
∞
t=0 is determined by the free entry condition in the R&D
sector;
4. the evolution of {rt, wt}
∞
t=0 is consistent with market clearing.
We can now move to a formal characterization of the Balanced Growth Path (BGP)
of this model. In keeping with Barro and Sala-i-Martin ([6], p. 34, footnote 11) and
Strulik ([55], p. 136), we define a BGP equilibrium as follows:
Definition 3 A BGP equilibrium in this economy is an equilibrium-path along which:
1. all variables depending on time grow at constant exponential rates;
2. the sectoral shares of labor employment (sj =
Ljt
Lt
, with j = Y, I,N) are constant.
We can now state the following:
12
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Proposition 1 There exists a unique BGP equilibrium in which the per capita levels
of output, consumption and asset holdings grow at the same constant rate.
Proof. See on-line Appendix A.
Along the BGP equilibrium, the following results do hold:14
N˙t
Nt
≡ γN = Ψn (18)
γy ≡
y˙t
yt
= γc ≡
c˙t
ct
= γa ≡
a˙t
at
= ΦΨn (19)
r = θΦΨn+ ρ (20)
where:
Φ ≡ α [m(1− β)− 1] R 0 and Ψ ≡
(
λ
1− φ
)
> 0
Equation (18) gives the BGP equilibrium growth rate of the economy’s number of
intermediate input varieties (N). According to equation (19), income (y), consump-
tion (c) and asset holdings (a), all expressed in per capita terms, grow at the same
constant rate in the BGP equilibrium. Equation (20) gives the BGP value of the real
rate of return on asset holdings (r).
Notice that (as in any canonical R&D-based growth model) the BGP growth rate
of per capita income is strictly related to the BGP innovation rate: γy = ΦγN . In
turn, as in the basic semi-endogenous growth model (Jones [30]), the innovation rate
(γN ) depends solely on the parameters of the innovation technology (λ and φ) and the
population growth rate (n), and is independent of the markup (m) and the parameter
measuring increasing complexity due to input proliferation (β).15 However, through
Φ, γy still depends on m and β. This implies that the degree of market power, the
extent of complexity, and the interactions between the two do ultimately matter for
the level of economic growth, and for the sign of the correlation between population
growth and economic growth in the long-run. This is something that we do not find in
the standard semi-endogenous growth model. In addition, from equations (18)-(20),
it is evident that γN is always positive whereas r is positive, as long as Φ is sufficiently
large, i.e. Φ > − ρθΨn .
Instead, for γy to be positive, Φ needs to be strictly greater than zero, which
implies that, in principle, we would restrict our attention to the case where 0 < β <
m−1
m < 1. In order to explain the economic rationale behind this condition, notice
that an increase in the markup leads to a decrease in the elasticity of substitution
14In the on-line Appendix A (not intended for publication), we also compute the BGP allocations of labor
across the final output, intermediate and research sectors and check for the respect of the transversality
condition.
15While m and β do not affect γN in the BGP equilibrium, they still impact: (i) on the market value of
any generic idea (VN , equation (9)), through the instantaneous profit of intermediate firms (πi, equation
6); (ii) on the wage (wN , equation (8)) accruing to one unit of research labor-input, through VN . As
a consequence, m and β are able to influence the allocation, through wage-equalization, of the available
labor-input across sectors (see equations (14) and (15)).
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between any pair of varieties of differentiated intermediate inputs and, therefore, to
weaker product market competition across capital-goods producers. This, in turn,
and ceteris paribus, can command higher instantaneous profits in the intermediate
sector (6),16 higher market prices for new ideas (9), and ultimately greater incentives
to expand further the set of available varieties of intermediate inputs (i.e., to increase
Nt). It is possible to show that, along a BGP, the level of per capita GDP is:
yt =
(
s1−αy s
α
I
)
N
α[m(1−β)−1]
t
where sY and sI are the constant shares of labor allocated in the long-run to the final
output and intermediate sectors, respectively. It is apparent from the last expression
that, following an increase in Nt, yt can (all the rest remaining equal) also rise if
β < m−1m < 1. In other words, our theory suggests that along a BGP the economy’s
growth rate can be positive only if the complexity effect (as summarized by a positive
value of β) is sufficiently low and, in any case, smaller than the corresponding special-
ization effect. This is compatible with the basic semi-endogenous growth model (see
Jones [29]), where (intermediate-)input proliferation yields no complexity effect at all.
However, since the main objective of the present paper is to study the macroeconomic
(growth) effects of intermediate input-variety proliferation, in what follows we do not
limit ourselves to the very restrictive case in which 0 < β < m−1m < 1. Instead we
present the results of our model in their more general form without imposing any
ex ante restriction on the magnitude of the upper bound of β.17 These results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Along the BGP we observe that:
1. Sign(γy) = Sign(Φ);
2. Sign
(
∂γy
∂n
)
= Sign(Φ);
3. Real per capita income growth is equal to zero in the absence of any population
change (i.e., when n = 0);
4. Sign
(
∂γy
∂m
)
depends on whether β is greater, smaller, or else equal to one.
Proof. The proof of the first part of the proposition is immediate when one takes
into account that in the model Ψ > 0 and n > 0. To prove the second part of the
16From equation (6), it is immediate to see that:
∂πi
∂m
=
( α
m
)(LY
N
)1−α(
LI
N
)α
Nα[m(1−β)−1]
[(
1
m
)
+ α(m− 1)(1− β) lnN
]
For given α ∈ (0, 1), m > 1, LY > 0, LI > 0 and N > 0, this derivative is clearly positive if the following
(sufficient) conditions do hold: β < 1, N ∈ [0,∞) sufficiently large.
17As a matter of fact, in our regressions we deal with negative GDP growth rates, as well (see Table 3).
In terms of our model, this is explained by the fact that in certain circumstances/countries, following the
proliferation of varieties of the same employed intermediate input, the resulting productivity-losses due to
increased complexity in production are sufficiently large (see our discussion at the end of section 2).
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proposition, notice that:
∂γy
∂n = ΨΦ. To prove the third result, we observe that in
equation (19) γy = 0 if n = 0. Equation (19) also implies that:
∂γy
∂m
≡


Ψn [α(1− β)] > 0 if β < 1
Ψn [α(1− β)] = 0 if β = 1
Ψn [α(1− β)] < 0 if β > 1

Using the definition of Φ and equation (19), we finally observe that:
- if 0 < β < m−1m , then: Φ > 0, γy > 0,
∂γy
∂n > 0 and
∂γy
∂m > 0;
- if β = m−1m , then: Φ = 0, γy = 0,
∂γy
∂n = 0 and
∂γy
∂m = 0;
- if m−1m < β < 1, then: Φ < 0, γy < 0,
∂γy
∂n < 0 and
∂γy
∂m > 0;
- if β = 1, then: Φ < 0, γy < 0,
∂γy
∂n < 0 and
∂γy
∂m = 0;
- if β > 1, then: Φ < 0, γy < 0,
∂γy
∂n < 0 and
∂γy
∂m < 0.
Proposition 2 suggest that the impact of the intermediate sector’s markup on real per
capita growth crucially depends on the sign of (1 − β). If β < 1, the specialization
gains obtained from an expansion in input variety are larger than the possible losses
due to more complexity in production and
∂γy
∂m > 0. If β > 1 , the specialization
gains are smaller than the possible losses due to more complexity in production and
∂γy
∂m < 0. Finally, when β = 1, the specialization gains are offset by the possible losses
due to more complexity in production and
∂γy
∂m = 0. Therefore, a decrease in m, by
increasing the elasticity of substitution across intermediate inputs and, hence, the
toughness of competition in this industry, can imply a lower, or a higher, or else no
effect at all on per capita income growth (PMC and economic growth are ambiguously
correlated in sign in the model).
The result that, in the absence of demographic change, growth in real per capita
income is equal to zero is a distinctive characteristic of any basic semi-endogenous
growth models (see Jones [30]). Our setting, however, includes additional features
that cannot be found in canonical semi-endogenous growth theory. In particular, the
relation between γN and γy is mediated by the term Φ ≡ α [m(1− β)− 1], unlike
Jones [30] (p. 767, equation (8)) where γN = γy = Ψn. Thus, while in Jones
[30] (p.780, equation (A1)) β = 0, and hence Φ ≡ α(m − 1) > 0, in our model
Φ can also be negative. This occurs, for any given m > 1, when β is sufficiently
large, β > (m − 1)/m ∈ (0, 1), i.e. when the complexity effect is strong enough
(which can ultimately lead to negative growth rates of per capita income when the
innovation activity expands). Moreover, since n affects positively γN (as in Jones
[30]), an increase in the rate of population growth can also imply (when Φ < 0, or
with a complexity effect particularly strong) a negative impact on per capita income
growth.18
18There is another trait that makes our model different from Jones [30]: in equation (19) the growth
rate of the economy depends not only on n and, among others, the parameters φ, λ and β, but also on m.
This specific difference with respect to Jones [30] can be ascribed to the fact that in our model we have:
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4 Quantitative analysis
From the theoretical analysis developed in the previous section, we obtain that an
economy’s real per capita GDP (RGDP, hereafter) growth rate can be related with
population growth and intermediate sector’s markup, in one of the three ways re-
ported in Table 1:
Table 1: Summary of the theoretical predictions
Case I 0 < β < m−1
m
∂γy
∂n
> 0 ∂γy
∂m
> 0
Case II m−1
m
≤ β ≤ 1 ∂γy
∂n
≤ 0 ∂γy
∂m
≥ 0
Case III β > 1 ∂γy
∂n
< 0 ∂γy
∂m
< 0
The rest of the paper will confront these predictions with the data. In particular,
we will estimate several models for equation (19). In doing this, we will abstract
from Ψ ≡ λ1−φ . In fact, since this term must be positive, this choice entails, at most,
an attenuation bias in our estimates.19 Using our theoretical model as a guidance,
the parameter estimates for population growth and the interaction between the latter
and the intermediate sector markup let us infer which effect is predominant, between
complexity and specialization.
Our results indicate that, on average, for the countries included in our sample, the
specialization effect is larger than the corresponding complexity effect . In particular,
when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, we document a positive role for
population growth in economic development, which, through the lens of our theory,
is ultimately due to a particularly strong specialization effect.20 We proceed now
by discussing the econometric strategy, then we illustrate the dataset and the main
findings of our empirical analysis.
(i) postulated that intermediate firms produce with labor (rather than forgone consumption) and, more
importantly, (ii) disentangled the intermediate firms’ gross markup of price over the marginal production
cost from the factor-input shares in GDP. It can be easily demonstrated that, using the Jones’ assumptions,
our model can exactly reproduce the BGP growth rate of the Jones’ economy. See on-line Appendix B for
further details.
19Omitting this multiplicative factor implies also that the coefficient associated to n, in the empirical
counterpart of equation (19), is not expected to be lower than 1.
20This result substantially departs from that portion of the empirical literature on the topic, which finds
either a general lack of or a negative correlation between population and economic growth rates (see Herzer
et al. [27] and Li and Zhang [41] and Kelley and Schmidt [36] among others).
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4.1 Econometric strategy
In this section, we estimate different models that are consistent with our theory. The
econometric approach we follow allows to test the behavior of per capita GDP growth
dynamics, under the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity affects parameters
estimation. In particular, we employ a finite mixture model (FMM), relaxing the
hypothesis of i.i.d. residuals (see Aitkin [4] and Alfo` et al. [5], among others), and
allowing for correlated random terms.21 In such a model, the random component
captures the impact of unobserved country-specific variables, limiting the effects of
the omitted variable bias. FMM allows to deal with the unobserved heterogeneity due
to the non-monotonic, non-uniform relationship between regressors and response, as
predicted by our theory. Moreover, through this estimation procedure we are able to
perform a cluster analysis: we sort countries into groups based on the homogeneity
of the conditional distribution of their long-run growth rates with respect to the
estimated unobservable factors.
According to the Generalized Linear Models framework (see McCullagh and Nelder
[43]), the empirical counterpart of equation (19) can be written as:22
E(γit|nit,mit) =m
T
i ω1i + n
T
i ω2i (21)
where γi,t is the per worker GDP growth rate,m
T
i is the vector of the annual products
between intermediate sector’s markup and population growth rate, nTi is the vector
of the annual population growth rates, for country i.23 The parameters ω2i and ω1i
capture the country-specific unobserved factors that affect per worker GDP growth,
through population change and its interaction with the intermediate sector’s markup.
Equation (21) entails a data generation process for per worker GDP growth that
can be affected by some hidden factors, underlying the relationship between mit and
nit. Conditionally to the regression parameters ηi = [ω1i, ω2i, σ
2
i ]
T, the probability
density function of γit is given by:
fγi = f(γit|ηi) =
T∏
t=1

 1√2πσ2i exp
[
−
1
2σ2i
(γit − ω1imit − ω2init)
2
]
 (22)
We assume that parameters in ηi can be empirically described by random vari-
ables, with unspecified probability function, and cluster-specific variances σi. In this
way, equation (22) takes explicitly into account the between countries random terms
correlation.
21Assuming that some of the fundamental covariates were not included into the model specification, and
that their joint effects can be accounted for by adding latent variables to the linear predictor, it is possible
to relax the assumption of i.i.d. residuals (Aitkin [4], McLachlan and Peel [45]).
22It is worth noting that, in the FMM presented in this paragraph, we consider only two random compo-
nents: population growth and its interaction with the intermediate sector’s markup. The set of unobserved
differences between countries is, however, potentially larger and multi-dimensional. Our approach, then,
has the limit of representing a multi-dimensional phenomenon on a reduced dimensional scale. In order to
tackle this issue, in section 4.4, we allow for a third random component.
23In this section, for notational simplicity, we omit the subscript y on the per worker GDP growth rate
γ.
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The nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE) of the distribution
is discrete (Laird [40], Heckman and Singer [26]), with a finite number of locations
and masses. This implies that the country-specific latent variables are modeled as
measures of the difference between country i-th’s covariates and their sample mean.
We assume that γit is a conditionally independent realization of the potential per
worker GDP growth, given the set of random factors, which varies over countries and
accounts for both individual variation and dependence among country-specific rates
of growth.
Let now ui denote the set of the country-specific unobservable factors that affect
mit and nit, i.e. ui = [u
T
ω1, u
T
ω2]. Treating the latent effects as nuisance parameters,
and integrating them out, we obtain the following likelihood function:
L (·) =
n∏
i=1


∫
U
fγidG(η)

 (23)
where U is the support for the latent variables space G(u), i.e. U is the discrete
probability measure on the space ηi, with k = 1, . . . ,K support points, each of them
with probability πk = π1, . . . , πK with
∑K
k=1 πk = 1. McLachlan and Peel [45] stress
that the mixture reduces to a simple homogenous regression when U degenerates in
a single support point with probability πk = 1. To avoid unbounded likelihood, we
assume a constant variance across mixture components, σi = σ. By introducing an
undefined random distribution of parameters, this specification allows to estimate un-
biased coefficients for population growth and its interaction with intermediate sector’s
markup, conditional to the effects of additional unobserved environmental variables.
Our goal is to find the best discretization of the conditional log likelihood, given the
data generating process of the response variable (Dempster et al. [17], McLachlan
and Krishnan [44], among others).
Equation (23) can be approximated by the sum of finite number (K) locations:
L (·) =
I∏
i=1
{
K∑
k=1
f (γi |mi,ni,uk )πk
}
=
I∏
i=1
{
K∑
k=1
[fikπk]
}
(24)
where f (γi |mi,ni,uk ) = fik denotes the response distribution in the k-th component
of the finite mixture. Locations uk and corresponding masses πk (prior probabilities)
represent unknown parameters while the optimal number of cluster K is estimated
via penalized likelihood criteria. This implies that:
∂ log[L (η)]
∂η
=
∂ℓ (η)
∂η
=
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1

 πkfikK∑
k=1
πkfik

 ∂ log fik∂η =
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
wik
∂ log fik
∂η
(25)
where wik represents the posterior probability that the i-th unit comes from the k-
th component of the mixture. The corresponding likelihood equations are weighted
sums of those of an ordinary log-linear regression model, with weights wik. Solving
these equations for a given set of weights, and updating the weights from the current
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parameter estimates, we define an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (see,
for instance, McLachlan and Peel [45], and Alfo` et al. [5] for the computation of EM
in growth context).
4.2 The data
In this section, we provide a description of our data and discuss the procedures
adopted to merge information from different sources in a single dataset.
First, we get data on real per worker GDP growth, population growth and ex-
change rate (to convert all the monetary values in constant 2005 US$) from the Penn
World Table database (PWT, hereafter).24
Second, in order to construct a measure for the markup in the intermediate sec-
tor25, we use the EUKLEMS database, which collects data on output, productivity,
employment (skilled and unskilled), physical capital at industry level, for all Euro-
pean Union member states and for five of the high developed countries (US, Japan,
Korea, Canada and Australia) from 1970 to 2007.26 At the lowest level of aggrega-
tion, data are collected for 72 industries according to the European NACE revision 1
classification. We proxy the intermediate sector with the sum of the following indus-
tries: basic metals and fabricated metal; electrical and optical equipment; electricity;
gas and water supply; machinery; other non-metallic mineral; rubber and plastics;
textile, leather and footwear; transport and storage; transport equipment; wood and
cork.
Following Griffith et al. [22], we compute the markup index for the intermediate
sector, of country i at time t, as follows:27
mit =
Value Addedit
Total Labor Costsit + Total Capital Costsit
(26)
where all variables are in nominal prices and are provided by EUKLEMS.28 In our
baseline regressions, m is an index set equal to 1 in the base year 1995.29
Third, in order to identify a country’s underlying complexity in production, we
use: i) the Network Trade Index (NTI) and ii) two alternative density measures,
based on Lafay’s index (ω˜LI) and Balassa index (ω˜BI). All the indexes are provided
by Ferrarini and Scaramozzino [20].30
Our final dataset consists of a sample that includes 23 OECD countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and USA), with a time span ranging from
24Time span: 1970-2007, 2005 as reference year. For more information on the PWT see: http://www.
rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/.
25There exist several methods to measure markups. See Nekarda and Ramey [46] for a review.
26For more information on the EUKLEMS database see: http://www.euklems.net/.
27Griffith et al. [22] point out that this approach is equivalent to that proposed by Roeger [51]. See
Klette [37] for a discussion.
28For details see Timmer et al. [56].
29Results with alternative measures for sector profitability are discussed in section 4.4.
30See the on-line Appendix D.
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1970 to 2007. Table 2 presents summary statistics. Table 3 shows that all countries
in the sample experienced a positive average per capita RGDP growth rate along
the period under observation. Since we are dealing with OECD countries, this is not
surprising. It is worth noting, however, that, the sample contains also observations
in which the 5-year average per capita RGDP growth rate is negative.
4.3 Results
Table 4 provides the estimation results for equation (21). Since the variation in
growth rates at annual frequencies may give misleading insights about the longer-
term growth process, we use the 5-year average per capita RGDP growth rate as
dependent variable.31
Columns (1) and (2) report OLS fixed effects and Feasible GLS estimates, respec-
tively. In the OLS fixed effects model, inference is biased because of the residuals’
non-normality (i.e., the Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the normality hypothesis with a
value 0.988 and a p-value=0.000) and the estimates are not statistically significant.
The FGLS model allows for heterogeneous variance in the residuals and takes into
account the possible correlation between the covariates. The estimated parameters
are consistent with our theory; in particular, the marginal effects on per capita RGDP
growth of population change (-0.4341) and intermediate sector’s markup (0.0072) sug-
gest that, on average, the specialization effect is slightly greater than the complexity
effect (Case II).
Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) report the Finite Mixture Model (FMM) estimates,
in which we relax the assumption of global normality of the residuals. Using the AIC,
we identify four clusters of countries, i.e. K = 4 in equations (24) and (25), listed
along with summary statistics for n and m and complexity indexes in Table 5.32 The
Shapiro-Wilk normality test on the residuals had p-value=0.987 in cluster 1, 0.032
in cluster 2, 0.245 in cluster 3, and 0.750 in cluster 4. The marginal effect of the
population growth rate is always tiny but positive and significant: an increase of 1%
in the population growth rate is associated to an increase in the long-run per capita
RGDP growth of 0.0176% in cluster 1, 0.0734% in cluster 2, 0.0214% in cluster 3
and 0.0420% in cluster 4. Instead, the impact of the intermediate sector’s markup is
found to be very close to zero for all the clusters, being tiny negative in the first two
clusters, tiny positive in cluster 4 and non-significant in cluster 3. This suggests that
countries in cluster 4 have performed in a way consistent with our theoretical Case I
while countries in cluster 1 and cluster 2, in which dγy/dn ≈ 0 and dγy/dm ≈ 0, lay
in between our theoretical Case I and II. Focusing on the average characteristics of
the clusters, it emerges immediately that the positive impact of population dynamics
on long-run growth decreases with the (average) population growth rate and increases
with the complexity in production, proxied by Network Trade Index and the density
indexes.
31Per capita RGDP is computed using the expenditure-side RGDP at chained PPP and population,
provided by the PWT.
32Complexity indexes are reported to allow a full comprehension of our results. However, they are not
used as a means of cluster characterization.
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4.4 Robustness checks
This subsection checks the robustness of our empirical results.33
Alternative specifications. In order to improve the soundness of our econo-
metric exercise, we estimate the FMM by adding a random intercept, which allows to
capture country specific unobserved factors. This innovation strengthens the results
of the baseline FMM. We obtain a better global fit: Figure 1 overlays the empirical
density function of γy, obtained via FMM, with intercept (left graph) and without
intercept (right graph), to that corresponding to observed data. We find again four
clusters of countries which differ, in their composition, from those obtained in the
previous model. Results are provided in Table 6. In two clusters, despite the pres-
ence of a third random component, both population change and intermediate sector’s
markup still exhibit a positive and significant impact on long-run growth. This is
consistent with the theoretical Case I. In cluster 1, composed by Ireland and Poland,
dγy/dn=0.512 and dγy/dm=0.010 while in cluster 2, composed by Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain, dγy/dn=1.282 and dγy/dm=0.026. Similar effects are also found for
countries in cluster 3 (Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Netherlands, United States). In this case, however, only the intercept is significant,
i.e. country variability is captured by country specific latent effect rather than n and
its interaction with m.
RGDP growth rate. First, we examine whether our results are sensitive to
different measures of RGDP growth rate. We run our regressions using the 5-year
average real per worker GDP growth rate as dependent variable, computed using
the expenditure-side RGDP at chained PPP (rgdpe) and the number of persons
engaged (emp), provided by the PWT. Alternatively, we employ the rate of change of
the RGDP using national-accounts growth rates (rgdpna) and the GDP per worker
growth provided by the World Bank. Although some modifications occur in the
composition of the clusters, our results do not change significantly. In particular,
the FMM still identifies four clusters of countries in which the marginal effect of
population growth on per capita RGDP growth is slightly positive.
Markups. Several robustness checks are carried out for the intermediate sector’s
markup. As usual, when dealing with index numbers, results can be dependent on
the base year. We use an alternative base year, the 1985, and we don’t find any
significant change in our estimates.
We also apply the procedure proposed by Roeger [51] to tackle the issue of the
empirical measurement of the markups. In particular, assuming the markup constant
over the period under observation, for each country, we run the following regression:
SRt − SRPt =
(
1−
1
m˜
)
[(∆pt +∆Qt − ut) + (∆rt +∆Kt − vt)] (27)
where: (SRt − SRPt) is the difference between the Solow residual and the price-
based Solow residual, m˜ is the intermediate sector’s markup, (∆pt +∆Qt) is the
nominal output growth, (∆rt +∆Kt) is the growth of capital cost. Both capital
costs and nominal output are measured with error, with vt ∼ i.i.d.(0, σv) and ut ∼
33As our results are robust to the alternative specifications used, for the sake of brevity we do not present
and discuss in detail all the parameters estimates. Of course, they are available upon request.
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i.i.d.(0, σu).
34 Estimates for m˜ are presented in Table 7 in the on-line Appendix E.
Because of the lack of time variability of m˜, using this estimated markup, rather
than the index computed using equation (26), implies less accurate estimates (with
p-values<0.1). Parameters and marginal effects, however, are in line with those
presented in the previous section. As a final exercise, we regress the sample mean of
per capita RGDP growth rate on the sample mean of population growth rate and the
interaction between the latter and the estimated markup m˜. In this case, we quantify
the marginal effect of n on long-run growth as 3.928 (p-value=0.000).
Human capital. Following to Bucci [14], we estimate a version of the model
in which the growth rate of the human capital (measured by the hc index provided
by PWT) replaces the growth rate of population. Qualitatively, our results do not
change. Estimates, however, are less accurate. Via FMM, we identify two (of four)
clusters of countries for which the the marginal effects dγy/dn and dγy/dm are con-
sistent with the theoretical Case I.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has re-assessed how the changing degree of production complexity (i.e.,
the number of horizontally-differentiated intermediate inputs entering the same ag-
gregate production function of a country) can ultimately affect not only the long-run
growth rate of per worker income, but also the relation between the latter variable,
population growth, and the degree of product market competition (PMC). Build-
ing upon Romer [52] and Jones [29] we developed a variant of the basic well-known
semi-endogenous growth model capable of explaining why we may observe (as sug-
gested by the already available empirical evidence) a non-uniform correlation between
population growth/economic growth and between economic growth/markups. The
theoretical explanation offered by our model is based on the idea that introducing new
varieties of intermediate inputs generates a tension between productivity-gains due
to more specialization and productivity-losses due to the presence of a more complex
production process. The composition of these two differential effects of technological
progress represents in the model the basis for the occurrence of a potentially non-
monotonous correlation between population growth/economic growth and between
PMC/economic growth.
The empirical analysis presented in the second part of the paper has suggested
that a different degree of production complexity yields in the long-run a different
growth rate of per worker output and, more importantly, a diverse impact of, re-
spectively, population growth and product market competition on economic growth.
In particular, using the 5-year average RGDP growth rate as a dependent variable,
we have documented that the specialization effect is larger than the corresponding
complexity effect. In the OLS and FGLS models, we obtain a slightly negative - but
not statistically significant - impact of population growth on long-run growth. In the
Finite Mixture Model with two random components, the marginal effect of popula-
tion dynamics on long-run growth becomes slightly positive, ranging from 0.0176 to
34Christopoulou and Vermeulen [16] apply the same empirical strategy to estimate price-marginal cost
ratios for 50 sectors in eight Euro area countries and the US over the period 1981-2004.
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0.0734. The model allows to identify four clusters of countries and show that a higher
complexity in production, here captured by a variety of indexes (the Network Trade
Index and the density measure based on the Layay Index and the Balassa Index ),
is associated to a larger impact of the population growth rate on the 5-year average
RGDP growth. Moreover, adding a third random component in the Finite Mixture
Model strengthens the role of population dynamics in two clusters.
In conclusion, our results tell a very consistent story: on average, along the period
1970-2007, the countries included in our sample display specialization gains from in-
novation that more than compensate the losses due to more complexity in production.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
m intermediate sector’s markup index (1995=1) 610 1.244 0.684 0.536 5.374
n annual population growth rate 610 2.430 2.187 -1.291 8.918
γc 5-year avg. per capita RGDP growth rate 610 12.973 9.425 -20.258 46.830
γw 5-year avg. per worker RGDP growth rate 610 13.795 10.258 -9.836 76.160
NTI Net Trade Index 432 0.214 0.224 0 1
ω˜BI Balassa’s index based product density 483 0.436 0.249 0 1
ω˜LI Lafay’s index based product density 483 0.456 0.203 0 1
Table 3: Descriptive statistic on 5-year average per capita RGDP growth rate
Country Min Mean Max
Australia 1.005 10.669 18.647
Austria 0.965 13.650 27.136
Belgium -13.283 11.172 26.152
Canada -2.281 10.727 20.689
Czech Republic -10.585 9.187 21.282
Denmark -1.576 9.224 23.524
Finland -11.393 11.676 33.294
France -8.735 9.204 23.231
Germany -3.247 12.021 25.554
Greece 12.619 18.116 23.081
Hungary 7.769 16.723 25.687
Ireland 13.528 27.762 46.830
Italy -4.953 13.442 31.526
Japan -3.337 13.726 37.062
Netherlands -4.457 11.512 30.814
Poland 11.609 24.690 37.718
Portugal -6.621 15.532 40.180
Slovak Republic -20.258 11.600 32.167
Slovenia -2.423 13.750 23.627
Spain -15.644 14.560 34.722
Sweden -1.808 10.994 24.456
United Kingdom 1.839 13.451 28.182
United States 1.652 10.354 17.671
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Table 4: Results, country level data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLSFE FGLS FMMk=1 FMMk=2 FMMk=3 FMMk=4
Dependent variable: 5-years per capita RGDP growth rate
m ∗ n 0.121 0.319 -0.005** -0.023** -0.012 0.005
n -0.669 -0.846** 0.023*** 0.100*** 0.044*** 0.035***
constant 0.142*** 0.135***
∂γy
∂n
-0.5125 -0.4341 0.0176*** 0.0734*** 0.0214*** 0.0420***
∂γy
∂m
0.0027 0.0072 -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003 0.0001**
obs. 597 597 94 175 154 187
Significance levels:* : 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
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Figure 1: Empirical cumulative functions for FMM in Table 4 (left panel) and FMM in
Table 6 (right panel)
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Table 5: FMM, Clusters
Country n m NTI ω˜LI ω˜BI
Cluster 1
Australia 6.602 1.359 0.051 0.255 0.166
Canada 5.595 0.920 0.077 0.384 0.336
United States 5.008 0.962 0.587 0.658 0.806
mean 5.735 1.081 0.239 0.432 0.436
std. dev. 0.658 0.198 0.247 0.168 0.270
Cluster 2
Austria 1.358 1.189 0.186 0.423 0.489
Belgium 1.089 1.443 . 0.508 0.366
Denmark 1.274 1.405 0.093 0.468 0.461
Germany 0.760 0.911 1.000 0.659 0.724
Slovenia 1.154 1.067 0.120 0.380 0.334
United Kingdom 1.119 0.918 0.228 0.739 0.852
mean 1.126 1.155 0.325 0.530 0.538
std. dev. 0.206 0.232 0.381 0.140 0.206
Cluster 3
Hungary -0.454 2.059 0.153 0.408 0.259
Ireland 4.711 0.927 0.032 0.197 0.155
Italy 1.240 0.827 0.407 0.814 0.745
Poland 2.168 3.322 0.179 0.530 0.403
Portugal 2.651 1.114 0.063 0.281 0.224
Slovak Republic 1.576 3.488 0.124 0.431 0.243
Spain 3.434 1.448 0.202 0.543 0.554
mean 2.190 1.883 0.166 0.458 0.369
std. dev. 1.653 1.117 0.122 0.201 0.213
Cluster 4
Czech Republic -0.110 1.392 0.203 0.747 0.804
Finland 1.843 0.922 0.120 0.196 0.163
France 2.648 1.623 0.415 0.715 0.802
Greece 3.502 2.197 0.017 0.242 0.242
Japan 2.579 0.903 0.518 0.653 0.833
Netherlands 3.165 1.513 0.173 0.415 0.429
Sweden 1.640 1.278 0.179 0.344 0.365
mean 2.181 1.404 0.232 0.473 0.520
std. dev. 1.207 0.445 0.174 0.230 0.287
Note: Model with 5-year avg. per capita RGDP growth rate as dependent variable.
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Table 6: Robustness I: FMM with 3 random components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FMMk=1 FMMk=2 FMMk=3 FMMk=4
Dependent variable: 5-years per capita RGDP
m ∗ n 0.293*** 0.829* 0.637 -0.709
n -0.110*** -0.033*** -0.369 0.419
constant 0.293*** 0.223*** 0.099*** 0.133***
∂γy
∂n
0.512*** 1.282*** 0.441 -0.574
∂γy
∂m
0.010*** 0.026*** 0.015 -0.013
obs. 192 88 268 31
Significance levels:* : 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
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